The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced on March 3 that it had launched the 13th wave of strikes in an operation it calls “Real Promise‑4,” saying a dawn assault using some 20 drones and three missiles hit U.S. targets in the Gulf. The statement named a U.S. air base in the Sheikh Isa area of Bahrain as a primary target and claimed the base’s main command building at Al Arifjan in Kuwait was destroyed and a fuel depot set ablaze, producing heavy smoke.
Iran’s announcement came three days after what Tehran described as a joint U.S.–Israeli strike on Iranian territory. Iranian state media framed the latest attacks as retaliatory and said they were aimed at U.S. military installations and Israeli-related targets across the region. Many of the casualty and damage claims circulated by Iranian outlets have not been independently verified by international monitors or U.S. officials.
The strike campaign forms part of a widening confrontation in the Gulf that has seen multiple rounds of Iranian counter‑attacks against fixed and mobile U.S. targets in Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, and direct strikes into Israel. On March 2 Iran declared the Strait of Hormuz closed and warned it would target any vessel trying to transit the waterway, raising immediate concern in energy markets and among global shippers.
Diplomatic signals have been mixed. Hours before the Feb. 28 assault Tehran and Washington were reported to be engaged in mediated talks, with Oman’s foreign minister saying Iran had met many U.S. negotiating demands. After the strikes, Iranian officials publicly rejected new talks with the United States and vowed an unrestricted retaliatory posture, while senior U.S. figures said their objective was not to topple Iran’s government, suggesting Washington may aim to limit the scope of conflict.
Militarily, the balance of power still favors the U.S. and Israel, which possess superior long‑range precision strikes, carrier groups and surveillance networks. But Tehran has demonstrated a growing ability to employ swarms of drones and ballistic missiles in coordinated strikes that can threaten regional bases and naval assets, complicating U.S. force protection and logistics. The Iranian leadership faces constraints of its own—ordnance stocks, regional basing options, and domestic stability—but has so far mounted rapid and multifront responses following attacks.
The human and economic costs are already tangible. Iranian claims of damage and U.S. reports of equipment and personnel losses have intensified domestic political pressures in Washington and Israel. Global oil markets reacted to the perceived risk of supply disruption, as the possibility of intermittent or sustained closure of the Strait of Hormuz poses a direct threat to shipments of Persian Gulf crude.
Absent a mutual decision to de‑escalate, the confrontation risks periodic bursts of violence rather than an immediate endgame. If Washington and its partners reject regime change as an objective, and if Iran’s leadership remains intact, the most likely near‑term path is a protracted, calibrated exchange in which each side seeks to impose costs without triggering uncontrollable escalation. That dynamic leaves room for both negotiated pauses and sudden flareups driven by miscalculation or domestic political imperatives.