Iran’s foreign ministry spokesman, Baghaei, told a regular briefing on March 3 that Tehran’s recent military activity is defensive and aimed at the sources of attacks on Iran rather than its neighbours. He insisted Iran has not sought to start a war and framed current operations as necessary resistance in the face of an asymmetry of power. Baghaei said Tehran had approached talks with the United States in good faith but was struck while negotiations were underway, arguing that any party that must stop the fighting is the attacker rather than Iran.
The remarks came after a rapid escalation in late February. On Feb. 26, Oman — the mediator — said indirect U.S.-Iran talks had made “significant progress” and that technical-level discussions would follow in Vienna. Two days later, U.S. and Israeli forces launched large-scale strikes on Iranian territory; state-linked Tasnim reported that Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was killed in the attack. Iran then fired back at U.S. bases in the region and at Israeli targets, intensifying a cycle of reprisals.
Baghaei’s public positioning serves several audiences at once. Internationally, Tehran is laying claim to the language of international law and the U.N. Charter, presenting its actions as legitimate self-defence. Domestically, the emphasis on resistance and the framing of Iran’s strategic posture as defensive bolster regimes that rely on a narrative of external threat to justify consolidation and mobilisation.
The immediate diplomatic consequence is stark: momentum built by Oman and tentative technical talks in Vienna have been sidelined by kinetic escalation. Even if technical delegations could reconvene, trust has been eroded; U.S. and Iranian negotiators will now have to reckon with military events that dramatically altered the bargaining table and public opinion in both countries.
Regionally, the episode risks widening the security dilemma. Tehran’s insistence that its strikes are not directed at neighbouring states will be viewed sceptically by Gulf capitals and Israel, which fear spillover and the emboldening of proxies. Washington’s coordination with Israel in the strikes also complicates efforts by European mediators and Gulf intermediaries to de-escalate, while great-power actors such as Russia and China may be prompted to recalibrate their regional posture.
For global markets and policy-makers, the clash underscores continued fragility in the Middle East: energy-market volatility, threats to commercial shipping in the Gulf, and the possibility of prolonged asymmetric campaigning against U.S. bases, allied assets, and maritime traffic. Absent a credible de-escalation mechanism or a new negotiating architecture that links security guarantees to political concessions, the region faces a protracted phase of tit-for-tat violence with limited channels for conflict resolution.