A senior mainland Chinese official reiterated a familiar but forceful message to Taiwan on March 4, saying that “Taiwan independence is a dead end” and that external powers cannot be relied on to secure the island’s future. Zeng Liqun, a delegate to the National People’s Congress and a standing director of the All‑China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots, framed his remarks in an interview with the Global Times as both a warning to Taiwan’s political leadership and an appeal to ordinary Taiwanese.
Zeng pointed to what he described as strengthening pillars of mainland power — robust economic resilience, steady enhancement of defence capabilities, and rising international influence — arguing these trends create a solid foundation for peaceful cross‑strait development. He also cast the upcoming 15th Five‑Year Plan as a historic window of opportunity for Taiwan to participate in cross‑border economic and social integration and to “share in the fruits” of Chinese modernisation.
At the same time, Zeng identified two major obstacles to that vision: the Democratic Progressive Party’s persistent refusal to accept the so‑called “1992 Consensus” and its insistence on a separatist stance, and the involvement of outside powers through arms sales and political interventions. He singled out recent U.S. arms packages and provocative statements from some Japanese politicians as actions that, he argued, ultimately harm Taiwan’s interests by treating the island as a pawn in larger geopolitical contests.
The remarks are part of a steady line of public diplomacy from mainland interlocutors aimed at both domestic and Taiwanese audiences. By combining admonitions about the risks of “independence” with an invitation to economic inclusion under the Five‑Year Plan framework, the message seeks to undermine the legitimacy of Taiwan’s pro‑independence actors while encouraging political and commercial channels that bind the island to the mainland.
For international observers, the significance is twofold. First, it underscores Beijing’s continuing reliance on a mix of coercive messaging and incentives to shape cross‑strait dynamics rather than abandoning the ides of eventual unification. Second, it signals that Beijing intends to tie its domestic economic planning to cross‑strait strategy, potentially increasing pressure on Taipei in both economic and security domains as the 15th Five‑Year Plan is rolled out.