Since the large-scale strikes launched by the United States and Israel late on February 28, the confrontation with Iran has spread fire across the region and entered a second week with no sign of abating. The immediate tactical picture — missile salvos, drone swarms and layered air defences — is being overtaken by a more strategic problem: who can sustain the supply of high-value munitions and who can endure a prolonged, attritional fight.
In a Pentagon briefing this week the U.S. defence secretary vowed that Washington and its partner would seek to “fully control” Iranian airspace within a short window, signalling intent to maintain pressure. The briefing, however, coincided with growing concern in U.S. and allied media and among military officials about the rapid depletion of expensive interceptors used to shoot down ballistic missiles and attack drones. U.S. military statements put munitions expended at scale: hundreds or thousands of weapons launched in recent days, and U.S. Central Command reported using over 2,000 rounds against nearly 2,000 Iranian targets.
The arithmetic is stark. Interceptors such as THAAD and sea-based SM-3 rounds cost millions apiece and are produced by a limited industrial base; Tehran’s drones and many of its rockets cost a few thousand dollars. Western and regional officials warn that several days of high-intensity exchanges could create temporary shortages of precision interceptors, forcing harder choices about what to engage and what to absorb.
Iran has not been passive. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has launched repeated counterstrikes, declaring new operational rounds and fielding faster suicide drones such as the newly publicised Hadid‑110. Tehran’s mix of ballistic missiles and cheaper, lower-signature drones has demonstrated capacity to penetrate layered defences, and Iranian officials appear comfortable with protracted attrition: domestic narratives cast the conflict as a defensive, existential struggle that will be sustained.
U.S. commanders say they are seeing a decline in the pace of Iranian ballistic launches and long‑range one‑way drones compared with the opening day, a development Washington credits to strikes against Iranian missile and launch infrastructure. Analysts offer a different, complementary reading: Iran is adjusting tactics to conserve its higher-value ballistic inventory while using lower-cost drones to force continued expenditure by its foes and to probe air-defence seams.
The operational consequence is a narrowing strategic window. If the U.S. and Israel can rapidly suppress Iran’s organised strike networks and secure air superiority before interceptor stocks fall below critical thresholds, they could shift to cheaper, more abundant air‑to‑ground munitions and sustain operations. If not, commanders will face choices: ration interceptors, accept greater damage to facilities and bases, or escalate further — including a politically perilous ground campaign that would be costly for all sides.
Politics and public will loom as large as logistics. In Washington, lawmakers of both parties are watching stockpiles and budget lines; U.S. leaders are signalling both determination and a desire to avoid a long, Iraq‑ or Afghanistan‑style commitment. In Jerusalem, leaders worry that the U.S. might strike a separate deal with Tehran that leaves Israel exposed. Tehran, by contrast, has framed the campaign as a life‑or‑death defence of sovereignty and appears prepared to trade attrition for time.
The near term will be decisive: depletion curves for interceptors, the resilience of Iranian production lines for rockets and drones, and the political appetite in Washington and Tel Aviv for sustained strikes will jointly shape whether this crisis contracts into a limited exchange or metastasises into a prolonged regional war. In that contest of resources and resolve, logistical constraints on high‑end munitions are the immediate pressure point, but the deeper arbiter will be the willingness of each government to keep fighting.