On 25 February Fangzheng Fubon Asset Management quietly announced that Cui Jianbo had stepped down as manager of the Xincheng 12‑Month Holding Mixed fund. The personnel change is unremarkable on its face, but it has reopened questions about Cui’s five‑year spell at Fangzheng Fubon, during which a high‑profile hire has failed to translate into compelling equity performance.
Cui arrived at Fangzheng Fubon in June 2020 with strong credentials. He was one of the so‑called “Xinhua Four” who helped power Xinhua Fund’s breakout years; during his tenure there several of his long‑running products posted multi‑hundred‑percent returns and annualised gains north of 15%. That pedigree set market expectations that he would deliver a revival in Fangzheng Fubon’s equity business.
Instead, Cui’s flagship product at the firm, Fangzheng Fubon Strategy Select Mixed A — which he took over in December 2020 — posted just 0.54% total return through 4 March 2026, leaving it in the middle to lower ranks of its peer group (806th out of 1,353 mixed‑equity funds). Other products he managed at the firm have lost money over multi‑year stretches, and his public profile has dimmed relative to his Xinhua years.
The problem is not only one manager. Fangzheng Fubon’s asset‑base has grown substantially since 2020 — to RMB 871.69 billion by end‑2025 — yet its business mix is heavily tilted toward fixed income and cash products. At the end of 2025 the firm had only around RMB 4.64 billion in equity funds and RMB 4.18 billion in mixed funds, versus RMB 34.1 billion in bond funds and RMB 44.25 billion in money‑market products. Fixed‑income and cash instruments therefore account for roughly 90% of assets under management.
That structural tilt helps explain why strong equity performance has not translated into scale. Tang Ge, a younger manager who took over a flexible allocation fund in November 2023, has produced striking returns — roughly 29.7% cumulative (about 11.9% annualised) for one fund and a separate product up almost 70% since launch — yet his assets under management remain tiny (about RMB 304 million). Conversely, Wu Hao, the firm’s largest equity manager by assets (RMB 4.32 billion), has delivered only middling relative returns.
The mismatch between performance and resource allocation raises probing questions about distribution, marketing and internal priorities. Investors and industry watchers note a pattern in which managers with stronger track records struggle to attract capital inside Fangzheng Fubon, while those with larger mandates do not always justify their resource share through outperformance. That disconnect — “good performance, small scale; mediocre performance, privileged allocation” — is a recurring theme in China’s crowded fund industry.
Cui’s muted output at Fangzheng Fubon speaks to wider headwinds facing active managers in China. Channel relationships with banks and wealth managers, product shelf space on platforms, and the firm’s own risk appetite for equity exposures matter as much as a manager’s stock‑picking skill. For Fangzheng Fubon, the near‑term challenge is structural: to translate headline AUM growth into a balanced franchise that can scale active equity strategies when market conditions reward them.
For Cui personally, the departure from one fund will fuel market speculation about his next move — whether a return to boutique asset management, a pivot back to absolute‑return strategies, or a quieter role inside or outside the public funds industry. For investors, the episode is a reminder that star names do not always carry their Xinhua era shine into new firms; organisational fit, incentives and distribution often determine whether performance follows pedigree.