A packed diplomatic press briefing at China’s annual Two Sessions — attended by roughly 450 reporters from more than 250 outlets — was designed as more than a rundown of foreign-policy talking points. Over nearly 90 minutes and 21 questions, Beijing sought to project a confidence that blends executive-level diplomacy with a message tailored for the Global South: China intends to be a stabilising, rule-respecting great power and a partner for development at scale.
The session ranged from head-of-state diplomacy and China’s rotating role in APEC to global governance, major-power relations and hotspots from the Middle East to Latin America. Officials repeatedly pushed two linked themes: opposition to a rollback into “jungle law” — summed up in the remark that “a harder fist does not make a stronger argument” — and an assurance to Chinese citizens overseas that “the motherland stands as steady as Mount Tai.” Analysts in Beijing described the tone as part reassurance, part sales pitch for China’s diplomatic model.
Beijing’s rhetorical line was anchored in domestic priorities. This year marks the opening of the 15th Five-Year Plan cycle, and Chinese analysts say policymakers view a peaceful external environment as essential for sustained development. Su Xiaohui of the China Institutes of International Studies argued that some states’ recent embrace of “strength-first” approaches risks provoking blowback and destabilising regions on which emerging economies depend — a scenario China says it wants to avert by opposing unilateral uses of force and by offering clearer diplomatic directions on ongoing crises.
Questions about big-power relations drew particular attention. Reporters pressed on ties with Russia and, repeatedly, with the United States — whose combined economic heft with China accounts for more than a third of global output. Gao Fei, president of the China Foreign Affairs University, framed 2026 as a “big year” for Sino‑US relations, reiterating Beijing’s insistence on mutual respect and peaceful coexistence as baseline conditions. The message was explicit: competition can co-exist with cooperation, but outright conflict between the two largest economies would have catastrophic global consequences.
Beyond crisis management, Beijing used the forum to promote what it styles as “China’s ideas” and “China’s solutions.” Officials previewed a busy diplomatic calendar, including an APEC leaders’ informal meeting and the China–Arab States Summit, and cast Belt and Road projects and other cooperation mechanisms as public goods that particularly benefit the Global South. The diplomat’s pitch: a multipolar, rule-based world should leave space for developing countries to wield influence and receive development finance and technology transfer from non-Western partners.
That message resonated with many foreign journalists at the Two Sessions, a significant number of whom came from developing countries. A Nigerian correspondent described hearing renewed Chinese assurances of non-interference coupled with practical help for Africa’s development; a Jamaican reporter said she was focused on China’s poverty-alleviation record — which Beijing estimates lifted some 800 million people out of extreme poverty — and whether elements of that model could be adapted by Caribbean states.
Such outreach matters because it shapes how the wider developing world perceives great-power competition. Beijing’s combination of normative claims (opposition to unilateral force, defence of sovereignty) and tangible offerings (infrastructure funding, technology cooperation) is designed to deepen political affinity and practical interdependence ahead of major diplomatic events and institutional reforms where China seeks greater voice.
Yet complications remain. The same period of assertive diplomacy that underscores China’s global ambitions also fuels suspicion in capitals wary of coercive economic or military behaviour. Western policymakers who view China’s growing institutional footprint as a challenge to the liberal order may be sceptical of purely rhetorical commitments to rules and stability. For recipient countries, dependency risks coexist with opportunities for faster development.
For international audiences the press briefing was both signal and instrument: Beijing is staging its foreign-policy posture as a stabilising foil to what it portrays as reckless uses of power, while simultaneously pressing an agenda of greater Chinese influence in global governance and development practice. How other major powers respond will shape whether China’s projected role as a provider of “certainty and stability” becomes enduring fact or contested aspiration.