At China’s annual political meetings this spring, Feng Xingya, chairman of state-controlled automaker GAC Group, laid out a high‑stakes plan to reconstitute the company as a broader mobility and technology player while restoring vehicle production and sales to roughly 2 million units in 2026. The strategy combines a domestic push into rural new energy vehicle (NEV) markets, an intensifying overseas expansion under a “ONE GAC 2.0” banner, and bold investments in battery swapping, humanoid robots and flying cars.
Feng framed rural China as a strategic priority: a large untapped consumer base, a stabiliser for domestic circulation and a place where better mobility can support emissions goals. Yet rural uptake remains constrained by sparse charging networks, limited fast‑charging stations, inadequate after‑sales service and weak financial support for buyers. To tackle those bottlenecks he urged accelerated deployment of charging and swap infrastructure, subsidies and policies to encourage service network roll‑out, and improved evaluation standards for NEVs designed for rural use.
Battery swapping is central to GAC’s technical and commercial pitch. Feng argued that swapping complements charging and can address range anxiety while fitting China’s broader decarbonisation aims. GAC has already introduced swap versions of several Aion models and plans a widespread “charge and swap” capability for future Aion A‑class cars through cooperation with CATL. But he warned that swap deployment faces obstacles in standards, returns on investment and regulatory frameworks and called for a nationally unified swap standard, operator subsidies and clearer rules on vehicle–battery separation.
Abroad, GAC is scaling up quickly: self‑branded exports nearly hit 130,000 units in 2025, up about 47% year‑on‑year, and early 2026 sales accelerated further. Feng’s overseas playbook includes building over 1,000 dealer and service outlets by 2026, localising production with knock‑down (KD) plants and pairing vehicle sales with energy and mobility services. That ambition collides with a perennial problem for Chinese makers: divergent technical standards and certification regimes overseas force costly reengineering. Feng therefore urged Beijing to promote Chinese automotive standards “going global” and to seek mutual recognition to lift the cost barrier to exports.
Beyond vehicles and networks, GAC has elevated artificial intelligence to a corporate strategy pillar and moved into humanoid robotics and low‑altitude air mobility. The GoMate Mini humanoid robot has been trialled in security and eldercare scenarios and is slated for mass production, with commercial model validation expected in 2026. On the urban air mobility front, GAC’s GOVY unit is developing a multi‑rotor AirCab and a composite‑wing AirJet; the AirCab reportedly has nearly 2,000 customer orders and aims for certification and deliveries by the end of 2026. Feng acknowledged steep hurdles: certification, airspace management, infrastructure and unclear commercial models.
These technology and market bets sit atop GAC’s three‑year “Panyu Action” reform, launched in late 2024 to transform the group from a traditional functional bureaucracy into a project‑driven, user‑oriented entity. Feng says 2025 was a foundation year: headquarters moved to Panyu, business units were reorganised and product development systems such as DSTE and IPD were introduced. Early results include shorter development cycles, efficiency gains in product planning and about 1.81 million vehicles sold in 2025, with successive quarterly improvements through the year.
If GAC hits its 2026 target of returning to a roughly 2 million vehicle scale, the payoff would be regained economies of scale for its mass businesses, momentum for its independent brands and stronger bargaining power overseas. But the company’s roadmap depends heavily on coordinated industrial policy — from national swap standards and rural infrastructure subsidies to low‑altitude airspace rules and international standards diplomacy. Execution risk is high: rivals are advancing their own technology stacks, and overseas market access will remain contingent on non‑tariff regulatory hurdles and local adaptation costs.
For global observers, GAC’s plan is a concentrated example of how Chinese automakers are moving beyond cars into energy services, robotics and air mobility while seeking state support to secure competitive advantage. The next 12–18 months will show whether systemic reforms and state coordination can convert ambitious pilots and policy proposals into sustainable sales growth and export competitiveness.