China’s Middle East special envoy, Zhai Jun, visited the United Arab Emirates on March 10 for high‑level talks in Abu Dhabi, meeting the UAE’s vice‑prime minister and foreign minister, Abdullah. The discussions focused on the spillover of recent fighting across the Gulf and on measures to protect Chinese people and institutions in the Emirates.
Abdullah outlined the UAE’s view of the regional situation, stressing that the country is not a party to the fighting and has sought to preserve stability. He thanked China for maintaining an impartial stance, welcomed Beijing’s shuttle diplomacy in the region and pledged that the UAE would do its utmost to protect Chinese citizens and facilities on Emirati soil.
Zhai expressed Beijing’s deep concern about the spread of hostilities across the Gulf and reiterated that the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of Gulf states must be respected. He condemned attacks on civilians and non‑military targets, argued that continuing conflict serves no party’s interests, and said China would work with the UAE to strengthen communication, coordinate outreach to other relevant actors and press for an early ceasefire.
During the visit, the envoy also held talks with the UAE president’s special envoy for China, identified in Chinese reports as Haledun, to discuss ways of deepening bilateral ties. The meetings underline a two‑track agenda: immediate crisis management in the Gulf and longer‑term efforts to expand China–UAE cooperation.
The visit is a practical demonstration of Beijing’s growing diplomatic activism in the Middle East. China has in recent years intensified commercial and political ties across the Gulf, and an ability to shuttle between regional capitals would enhance its credentials as a security broker as well as an economic partner. Protecting Chinese nationals and assets — a consistent refrain in Zhai’s talks — is also a pragmatic imperative given China’s large expatriate footprint and investments in the energy, infrastructure and services sectors.
But Beijing’s leverage is constrained. While Gulf states appreciate China’s neutrality and convening capacity, China lacks the hard‑power levers and security guarantees that other external actors can bring. Effective mediation will require working with regional players and other international mediators, and Beijing must balance its relationships with multiple parties to avoid being perceived as partial.
For Washington and other outside powers, China’s visible role in crisis‑management presents both opportunities and challenges. A pragmatic Chinese push for de‑escalation could complement Western and regional efforts to stabilise the Gulf, yet it also increases Beijing’s diplomatic footprint in an area long considered strategically contested. Observers should watch whether Zhai’s trip is the start of sustained shuttle diplomacy or a short‑term confidence‑building exercise.
