More than 300 serving soldiers, recruits, civilian staff, militia cadres and students recently retraced the wartime paths of the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army in and around Tonghua, Jilin province. The two-day programme, organised jointly by the Tonghua military sub-district and a People’s Liberation Army unit calling itself the “Yang Jingyu Detachment,” combined oath-taking at the Yang Jingyu martyrs’ cemetery, museum visits, classroom teaching at a local middle school and a march to the Five Women Peak guerrilla camp site.
Organisers described the event as immersive political education aimed at embedding the “Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army spirit” into the blood and soul of new recruits, civilian hires and militia members. The exercise followed last year’s ceremonial return and placement of the detachment’s battle flag in the region and used the recruitment cycle as an opportunity to link individual pledges of loyalty to collective historical memory.
The choice of Yang Jingyu as the focal point is deliberate. A guerrilla commander who fought Japanese occupiers in Manchuria and was killed in 1940, Yang is one of the Communist movement’s enduring regional martyrs and a frequent subject of state-sponsored commemorations. Events such as this fuse local history, school-based patriotic education and the military’s political work into a single narrative of sacrifice and service, reinforcing both civic pride and military legitimacy.
Beyond symbolism, the activity has practical functions. New conscripts and militia recruits were exposed to field visits and training alongside regular troops, helping to familiarise reserves and grassroots defence personnel with military culture and expectations. Authorities framed the exercises as contributing to readiness: recruits depart for service with heightened ideological commitment while local militia and reservists return to their posts with renewed motivation to drill and prepare.
This event sits within a broader pattern of intensified “red education” campaigns and civil–military integration across China. Since the PLA’s reforms and professionalisation drive, political commissars and party cells have emphasised the transmission of revolutionary legend as a tool to cultivate obedience and cohesion. Localised ceremonies, school outreach and cross-regional joint activities are emerging as everyday levers for sustaining this work.
For international observers, the immediate significance is not a change in force posture but a window into how Beijing sustains the domestic foundations of its military power. Regular, visible indoctrination and recruitment-focused outreach increase the pool of politically reliable personnel and normalise the presence of military institutions in civic life. The long-term effect is a populace more accustomed to state narratives about sacrifice and national defence, which could lower the political cost of mobilisation in a crisis.
Organisers in Tonghua said the programme will be continued and expanded, exploring cross-regional joint training and fresh educational formats. Whether scaled up across other provinces or adapted for different audiences, these initiatives form a continuing strand of the party’s strategy to blend heritage, schooling and military preparedness into a cohesive national project.