Washington’s recent campaign of withdrawals from international institutions, coupled with an effort to erect new, US-centred clubs, is redrawing the architecture of global governance. In early January the White House issued a memorandum to pull the United States out of some 66 international organisations — a mix of roughly 31 UN entities and 35 non‑UN bodies — and by late January the president was promoting a self-styled Gaza “peace commission” that would invite about 60 countries and organisations and, according to the draft charter, reward billion‑dollar donors with permanent membership. The proposal, which pictures the president as a lifelong chair, has been derided by some diplomats as a bid to create a “Trump UN”.
The administration frames the exodus as ruthless housekeeping: multilateral institutions are dismissed as redundant, wasteful or hostile to American interests and values. Senior US officials have argued that continuing to underwrite bodies that allegedly mismanage funds or promote policies at odds with US priorities is untenable. The line is blunt and transactional — use the institutions while they serve you, abandon them when they do not.
Beyond rhetoric, however, this pattern reflects a deeper shift in international power dynamics. The post‑war settlement depended on the United States having disproportionate agenda‑setting power inside multilateral forums; that de facto monopoly weakens as emerging economies gain voice and coalitions of states refuse Washington’s terms. When the United States can no longer reliably translate funding into control, a tool‑centric approach to international engagement — “join if useful, quit if not” — becomes politically appealing at home but corrosive abroad.
Domestic pressures help explain the calculus. The US federal debt has climbed towards $40 trillion and interest payments have surged into the vicinity of a trillion dollars annually, while infrastructure needs, manufacturing decline and widening inequality press on budgets. Seen through this lens, every international subscription is now weighed on a narrow cost‑benefit ledger; short‑term savings at the expense of long‑term influence look rational to policymakers focused on immediate fiscal metrics.
That narrow accounting, though, risks eroding a different kind of capital: predictable behaviour. State creditworthiness and geopolitical influence are not only balance‑sheet items but reputational assets built over decades of steady participation in rules and norms. A pattern of unpredictable exits, selective compliance and unpaid dues creates uncertainty that markets and partners hate far more than single policy shifts.
Signs of that market anxiety are already visible. The dollar’s role as the ultimate safe asset rests in part on trust in America’s stability and adherence to rules; actions such as weaponising payment systems, freezing foreign reserves and quitting treaties have chipped away at that psychological underpinning. Gold prices have risen and several central banks have accelerated repatriation of bullion from New York vaults as a basic hedge against credit and policy risk.
Allies are caught in an awkward middle. Europe remains dependent on the US for security even as it drifts from Washington on climate and trade policy; long‑standing partners like Japan and Canada publicly keep a low profile but privately diversify ties with emerging economies. New pay‑to‑play arrangements and lifetime‑chair proposals function more as domestic signalling and international theatre than as stable institutional substitutes; many states have reacted coolly to the proposed Gaza commission, underscoring how difficult it is to erect a credible, long‑lasting alternative to established multilateral bodies.
The withdrawal strategy is already producing material consequences. The World Health Organization faces a $560m–$650m shortfall attributed to arrears from the United States, prompting layoffs and regional office closures that reduce vaccine distribution and disease‑surveillance capacity. UNESCO and other specialised agencies have also seen their influence shrink where US funding and participation once mattered most.
In the short run, pruning international spending offers tangible fiscal relief. Over the longer horizon, however, dismantling or hollowing out multilateral platforms risks undercutting the very security, economic and reputational foundations that have sustained American influence for decades. The strategic question for Washington’s partners is whether to compensate, form new coalitions that bypass the US, or try to rebuild a rules‑based system with diminished American ownership — each path narrowing the policy options available to the United States itself.