Anta Sports has taken a bold step toward internationalisation, agreeing to buy a 29.06% stake in Puma SE for €1.5 billion, making the Chinese group the German brand’s largest single shareholder. The deal, announced after markets closed on 26 January and expected to complete by the end of 2026, marks Anta’s most consequential overseas move since it built a multi‑brand empire by importing Western labels into China.
For more than a decade Anta has scaled by acquisition, turning FILA into a Chinese powerhouse and assembling a stable of niche international names—Descente, Kolon Sport, Jack Wolfskin and a controlling position in Amer Sports among them. That strategy helped Anta grow into China’s biggest sportswear group: in 2024 the company reported RMB 708.26 billion in revenue, with Anta and FILA still supplying roughly 79% of that total.
But the twin engines of Anta and FILA are losing momentum. Recently reported softening in consumer demand left Anta’s home market growth stalling—Anta brand sales contracted slightly in Q4 2025 after 11 quarters of expansion, and FILA’s growth has decelerated to mid‑single digits. Faced with a saturated domestic market, Anta’s pursuit of Puma is an explicit bid to buy international scale and brand recognition rather than incremental share in China.
The economics of the purchase are notable. Anta offered €35 per share—below the €40–50 range previously hoped for by the Pinault family’s Groupe Artémis, yet roughly a 60% premium to Puma’s pre‑announcement trading price. Puma itself has recently underperformed: first‑half 2025 revenue fell to €4.018 billion and the company reported a €247 million net loss. Anta says it will fund the deal from cash reserves; as of June 2025 it reported net cash of RMB 31.539 billion.
Strategically, the fit is imperfect. Puma and Anta overlap in product categories and already compete in China, where Puma has a long‑established presence. Unlike smaller niche brands Anta has successfully relaunched by plugging them into its China distribution and marketing machine, Puma offers far less low‑hanging fruit in that market. Moreover, a 29.06% stake—while powerful—does not constitute full control, meaning any integration will depend on board influence, management cooperation and potentially delicate negotiations with other shareholders.
The acquisition will nevertheless change the competitive terrain. If Anta can extract supply‑chain efficiencies, coordinate global marketing and use Puma’s European and Latin American reach to plant its other labels abroad, it will become a more credible rival to Nike and Adidas. The move also reflects a broader trend: Chinese consumer champions are shifting capital and strategic focus offshore in search of the next phase of growth. Yet execution risks are real—brand cannibalisation, governance friction and geopolitical scrutiny could all complicate Anta’s attempt to turn a minority stake into meaningful global clout.