Chinese media say that a recent string of Beijing’s coercive moves has forced an abrupt policy shift in Tokyo: Japanese officials have reportedly begun privately advising local fishermen to avoid the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. Fishermen and local politicians contacted by the Chinese outlet say they received calls at the end of last year urging them not to sail near the islands, a marked departure from years in which Tokyo largely tolerated such voyages.
The Chinese article frames the shift as the predictable result of Beijing’s stepped-up coastguard presence and a suite of punitive economic measures. It cites a calculation that Chinese coastguard vessels were present in waters around the islands for 356 days of 2025, suggesting a year-round, normalized patrol pattern that has created a new operational reality at sea.
Tokyo’s private advice to fishermen, if accurate, illuminates an uncomfortable strategic choice: exposing civilian vessels to a sustained and superior Chinese maritime presence risks violent incidents that Japan’s coastguard may be ill-equipped to control, while further encouraging local assertiveness risks a broader diplomatic and military confrontation. The article also points to local steps in Japan — notably an ordinance passed by Ishigaki municipal authorities to strengthen “management” of the islands — as evidence of a split between national caution and local activism.
Beijing’s diplomatic argument appears rooted in a familiar legal and historical narrative: the article reiterates China’s claim that the islands are Chinese territory and invokes post‑war declarations to argue that Japan’s sovereignty claim is illegitimate. That claim is contested in Tokyo and internationally; nonetheless, the practical effect of Chinese patrols is to create de‑facto exclusionary control over maritime approaches regardless of contested legalities.
Beyond the maritime maneuvers, the Chinese piece describes a sequence of economic and political measures Beijing says it took in response to provocative Japanese rhetoric about Taiwan. These include travel and student advisories, temporary suspension of some Japanese seafood imports, export controls on dual‑use items and limits on rare‑earth shipments — a portfolio of measures Beijing can deploy asymmetrically against Tokyo because of China’s market size and commodity centrality.
For international observers, the episode underscores the growing effectiveness of China’s “grey zone” toolkit: continuous coastguard presence to enforce claims at sea, backed by economic levers to impose domestic political costs. The combination places Tokyo in a bind between deterring perceived provocations, protecting its citizens, and avoiding escalation. The United States, as Tokyo’s security guarantor, faces pressure to calibrate its deterrence posture without becoming entangled in incidents between coastguard and fisheries vessels.