On February 10, Chinese leader Xi Jinping conducted a video inspection of People’s Liberation Army units from the Bayi Building in Beijing, extending Lunar New Year greetings and bedside assurances of readiness to service members across the army, navy, air force, rocket forces and other specialised units. State media footage showed reports from an army brigade battalion, the navy ship Anhui, an air force aviation brigade, a rocket force brigade, military space, cyberspace and information support formations, logistics and a People’s Armed Police detachment. The synchronized exchange of greetings and situation reports emphasised both the loyalty of the armed forces and their operational preparedness during a period when many civilians are focused on holiday travel and family reunions.
The ritual of a pre‑Spring Festival inspection is familiar in Beijing, a tradition that blends public morale‑building with a demonstration of command continuity. Conducted by video rather than in person, this exercise highlights both the habit of top‑level visibility and the modern communications being used to link a geographically dispersed, increasingly high‑tech force directly to the commander‑in‑chief. Presenting units from conventional formations alongside cyber, space, information support and logistics makes explicit the PLA’s emphasis on integrated, joint operations that span traditional and new domains.
Domestically, the message is twofold: reassure the public that the military will preserve stability over the holiday, and reinforce internal discipline and loyalty at a time when political legitimacy is routinely reasserted through ritualized visits. Internationally, the optics serve as a subtle signal of deterrence and readiness. By showcasing the Rocket Force and space and cyber components alongside surface and air units, Beijing underscores that its escalatory toolkit is not limited to conventional options, a reminder to regional and global audiences of the PLA’s evolving capabilities.
The inclusion of logistics and joint support elements in the inspection is notable because modern expeditionary and high‑intensity operations depend on seamless sustainment as much as advanced weapons. By drawing attention to warehouses, information support centres and joint logistics formations, the leadership stresses the backend of combat power—command, control and sustainment—that must function continuously, including during national holidays. Such emphasis aligns with years of PLA reforms aimed at improving jointness, rapid mobilization and the integration of tech‑heavy forces.
This demonstration also feeds into an ongoing narrative in Beijing about the normalization of military readiness. In recent years the PLA has combined high‑profile exercises with tighter political oversight and a more public face for specialised forces. Video inspections allow central leadership to amplify that narrative while projecting an image of personal care for ordinary servicemen and women, which is useful for public relations and internal morale alike.
For foreign governments and militaries, the inspection is a reminder to treat Chinese force posture as comprehensive rather than narrowly regional or domain‑specific. Analysts should read such ceremonies not only as domestic spectacle but as calibrated communications about operational priorities—cyber and space capabilities, precision strike forces, and logistics readiness—areas that shape deterrence calculations and contingency planning across the Indo‑Pacific.
Ultimately, the February 10 inspection was both ceremony and substance: a holiday‑period reassurance to the Chinese population and troops, and a deliberate, visible signal that the PLA is organized and prepared across multiple domains. As Beijing continues to modernize its armed forces and integrate new capabilities, these periodic inspections—especially when amplified by state media—will remain a useful lens for observers seeking to understand China’s strategic posture and priorities.