The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) recently concluded a series of high-intensity combat drills in the West Pacific, signaling a profound shift in China’s naval aviation doctrine. Led by the aircraft carrier Liaoning, the strike group engaged in complex maneuvers designed to test tactical flight, live-fire capabilities, and comprehensive search-and-rescue operations. These exercises represent a departure from routine training, focusing instead on validating the fleet’s ability to operate in unpredictable maritime environments far from the mainland.
Central to these maneuvers is the imminent integration of the J-35, China’s next-generation stealth fighter, along with the J-15T, a modernized catapult-capable variant of the existing fleet. Military analysts confirm that these advanced airframes are being optimized for compatibility with the ski-jump decks of the Liaoning and Shandong. This technical achievement allows China's older carriers to overcome the traditional payload and range limitations inherent in short-takeoff, barrier-arrested recovery (STOBAR) designs.
The strategic implications of this shift are significant, as it effectively doubles the combat effectiveness of China's current carrier fleet. By deploying the J-35 on existing vessels, the PLAN introduces stealth technology and superior sensor fusion to the West Pacific years earlier than previously anticipated. This transition creates a unified carrier wing architecture where sophisticated aircraft can be flexibly deployed across both older ski-jump carriers and the newer catapult-equipped Fujian.
Furthermore, the focus on 'dynamic ship finding'—where pilots must locate their carrier in radio-silent, ever-changing positions—demonstrates a growing maturity in blue-water operations. In a high-end conflict, the ability to maintain high sortie rates while the carrier maneuvers aggressively is a critical survival trait. As the J-35 moves toward full operational status, the PLA Navy is positioning its older carriers to maintain a credible presence against fourth- and fifth-generation threats in the 'Second Island Chain.'