A recent two‑week Red Flag exercise at Nellis Air Force Base drew attention not for a kinetic clash but for a change in the choreography. For the first time, U.S. Marines’ F‑35B aircraft were assigned to the “red” side to mimic the tactics of China’s emerging J‑35 stealth fighter, part of a wider move by the U.S. Air Force to rehearse combat against Chinese fifth‑generation capabilities.
The decision was flagged by British coverage of the joint U.S.–U.K. drills in the Nevada desert, which said the red team’s adoption of a fifth‑generation surrogate signals a clear focus on the J‑20 and J‑35 family of Chinese aircraft. The U.S. has not publicly declared a single hypothetical opponent for the exercise, but the inclusion of stealth‑era tactics in the aggressor role is an unmistakable nod to Beijing’s modernising air force.
This development builds on the 2022 rebirth of the 65th “Invaders” aggressor squadron at Nellis, a unit with a Cold War pedigree for impersonating Soviet forces. Historically the 65th went to theatrical lengths—paint schemes, language drills and even rations—to think like an adversary. The contemporary incarnation is similarly focused, with commanders saying the squadron will specialise in recreating the tactics of foreign fifth‑generation fighters, particularly those China is fielding.
The shift reflects a stark change in U.S. training priorities. For decades the Pentagon’s primary contested‑aircraft scenario was Russian, but Beijing’s accelerated aircraft development and submarine and missile programmes have pushed China to the top of U.S. strategic concerns. Practising against a surrogate J‑35 or J‑20 allows Western pilots to rehearse sensor fusion, low‑observable tactics and the kinds of data‑driven engagements that define modern aerial combat.
Surrogacy, however, comes with caveats. An F‑35B can imitate certain manoeuvres and emission profiles, but it cannot exactly replicate Chinese radar cross‑section, avionics suites or the particular electronic‑warfare and datalink ecosystems of a J‑20 or J‑35. Training against a familiar airframe that is painted and flown “as if” Chinese may produce useful tactical rehearsal but cannot substitute for real‑world measurements of signature management and integrated air‑defence behaviour.
Beyond the technicalities, there is a symbolic dimension. The reactivated 65th’s work is signalling intent as much as preparing tactics: a public illustration that the U.S. will train to meet China’s best assets head on. That signal matters to allies and adversaries alike. It reassures partners in the Indo‑Pacific that Washington is investing in credible deterrence while also telegraphing to Beijing that its new platforms are being treated as operationally consequential.
The move also risks reinforcing an arms‑race dynamic in doctrine and training. As the West rehearses responses to Chinese fifth‑generation fighters, China will refine its concepts of employment and countermeasures. Neither side gains perfect knowledge from surrogacy alone, but both can accelerate iterative improvements to aircraft, sensors and squadron tactics grounded in what they observe and anticipate from the other.
For commanders tasked with preparing for high‑end warfare, the imperative is straightforward: pilots must practice against something that approximates the capabilities they expect to face. For analysts and policymakers, the important question is how much of the gap between surrogate and reality can be closed through intelligence, open‑source study and iterative exercises, and how these preparations will influence escalation dynamics in contested theatres such as the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait.